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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ABDELAZIZ ABOELSEUD,
Defendant/Appellant
CaseNo.95-374-CA
vs.
Priority 2

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPELLATE COURT JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(d) and § 78-2a3(e).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue One: Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the defendant/appellant
("Mr. Aboelseud") waived the statutory requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 that
the plaintiff/appellee ("State") prove he was properly served with a copy of the protective
order which he is alleged to have violated.
Standard of Review: The trial court's ruling is a question of law, and is reviewed
for correctness. See Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1192 (Utah 1993); Southern Title
Guar. Co. v. Bethers, 761 P.2d 951.954 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
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Issue Two: Whether the trial court erred in ruling that Mr. Aboelseud violated the
protective order by attempting to telephone the parents of Stephana Garcia ("Ms. Garcia")
at their place of residence, where the protective order does not prohibit Mr. Aboelseud
from contacting Ms. Garcia's parents, and whether such ruling violates Mr. Aboelseud's
rights to due process under the constitutions of the State of Utah and United States.
Standard of Review: The trial court's ruling is a question of law, and is reviewed
for correctness. See Baldwin, 850 P.2d 1188.
Issue Three: Whether the trial court's ruling that a negligent violation of a
protective order constitutes a criminal violation under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 is
erroneous.
Standard of Review: This question is a question of law, and is reviewed for
correctness. See Baldwin, 850 P.2d 1188.
Issue Four: Whether the trial court's ruling is erroneous in light of the fact that
Ms. Garcia consented to contact from Mr. Aboelseud by answering the telephone when
she had actual knowledge that Mr. Aboelseud was the person calling.
Standard of Review: This question is a question of law, and is reviewed for
correctness. See Baldwin, 850 P.2d 1188.
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (as amended May 3, 1993)1 and Utah Code Ann. §
30-6-5(5)(a), (6) (as amended May 3,1993) are the primary determinative statutes.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (as amended May 3, 1993) provides as follows:
Any person who has been restrained from abusing or
contacting another or ordered to vacate a dwelling or
remain away from the premises of the other's residence,
employment or other place as ordered by the court under a
protective order or ex parte protective order issued under
Title 30, Chapter 6, or Title 78, Chapter 3a, who violates
that order after having been properly served with it, is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-5(5)(a), (6) (as amended May 3, 1993) provides:
(5) Upon issuance of a protective order, either ex parte or
following a hearing, the court clerk shall provide four
certified copies to the party protected by that order. The
protected part)' shall keep one certified copy and shall:
(a) cause a certified copy to be served on the
party restrained, in accordance with Rule 4
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure;
(6) If the defendant has been personally served with the ex
parte protective order and notice of the hearing regardless if
he appears at the hearing, and the court issues a protective
order, the terms of the ex parte protective order shall
remain in effect until a certified copy of the protective order
is properly served on the defendant.

'Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 was amended effective July 1, 1995, after the trial of this matter and,
therefore, the 1995 amendment is not determinative. However, as set forth more fully below, the 1995
amendment clarifies that a violation of a protective order must be intentional to constitute a criminal
offense, thereby evidencing additional reasons that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case. This is a criminal action whereby the State asserted that Mr.
Aboelseud violated a mutual protective order by placing telephone calls to the residence
of Ms. Garcia's parents.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. The State brought two criminal
charges against Mr. Aboelseud pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108, alleging that Mr.
Aboelseud violated a mutual protective order (granted in a protective order proceeding
commenced by Mr. Aboelseud) by (1) appearing at an open court proceeding where Ms.
Garcia was appearing for a pre-trial on criminal charges of assault and battery against Mr.
Aboelseud,2 and by (2) placing telephone calls to the residence of Ms. Garcia's parents,
where Ms. Garcia and Mr. Aboelsued's two children also resided. At the trial held on
April 28, 1995, the State stipulated that Mr. Aboelseud had never been served in the
manner required by Utah R. Civ. P. 4 with a certified copy of the protective order. The
trial court ruled, however, that service in the manner contemplated by Utah R. Civ. P. 4
of a certified copy of a mutual protective order is not required where the party restrained
by the protective order is present at the hearing where the protective order is granted, that
Mr. Aboelseud was precluded from raising lack of proper service as a defense to the
criminal charges, and that Mr. Aboelseud waived the personal service requirement of
Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-5 by filing a complaint asking that the district court issue a

2

Ms. Garcia testified at trial that she ultimately pleaded guilty to these charges. (R. at 68).
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protective order in his favor and against Ms. Garcia and by having Ms. Garcia sign an
acceptance of service of process, waiving the formal requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 4.
The trial court then ruled that Mr. Aboelseud did not violate the protective order
by appearing at the court proceeding, and dismissed the first count alleged against Mr.
Aboelseud. The trial court then ruled, however, that Mr. Aboelseud was guilty of the
second count of violating the protective order. On May 30, 1995, Mr. Aboelseud filed his
notice of appeal, appealing the conviction on the second count.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Mr. Aboelseud had a long-term on and off relationship with Ms. Garcia.

(R. at 59).
2.

Mr. Aboelseud is the father of two minor children, ages 5 and 2, whose

mother is Ms. Garcia. (R. at 69).
3.

Ms. Garcia refused to acknowledge that Mr. Aboelseud is the father of at

least one of the children and. therefore, Mr. Aboelseud was required to commence a
paternity action, pro se, in order to establish his relationship as the father, and so he could
obtain visitation with his children. (R. at 71-73 ).
4.

In about September 1994, Mr. Aboelseud commenced an action in the

Third District Court, State of Utah seeking a protective order pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 30-6-5, seeking protection from Ms. Garcia, who had physically attacked him on more
than one occasion. (R. at 59, 60, State's Exhibits 1, 2 and 3).

5

5.

On September 28, 1994, a hearing was held before the Honorable

Commissioner Michael S. Evans, pursuant to which Mr. Aboelseud's motion for
protective order was granted. (R. at 61, State's Exhibit 2).
6.

In addition, the Honorable Commissioner Michael S. Evans entered a

protective order in favor of Ms. Garcia. Thus, a mutual protective order was entered by
the Honorable Commissioner Michael S. Evans, which was subsequently entered by the
Third District Court on October 6, 1994. (R. at 18, State's Exhibit 2).
7.

The Protective Order provides, without limitation, that Mr. Aboelseud "is

restrained from any contact whatsoever with [Ms. Garcia]." (State's Exhibit 2).
8.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 provides that a person who has been

restrained from having contact with another person, pursuant to a protective order issued
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1, et seq., is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if that
person violates the protective order "after having been properly served with it..." Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (emphasis added).
9.

Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-5(5) provides, in part:

Upon issuance of a protective order, either ex parte or following a hearing,
the court clerk shall provide four certified copies to the party protected by
that order. The protected party shall keep one certified copy and shall:
(a) cause a certified copy to be served on the party
restrained, in accordance with Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure;
10.

At the trial the State stipulated to the fact that Ms. Garcia never formally

served Mr. Aboelseud with a certified copy of the protective order in the manner
contemplated by Rule 4, Utah R. Civ. P. (R. at 46-47).
6

11.

Instead, the State argued that formal service was not required because Mr.

Aboelseud had initiated the protective order proceeding, was present at the hearing at
which the protective order was issued, and had actual notice of the existence of the
protective order. (R. at 47).
12.

The trial court ruled that by virtue of the fact Mr. Aboelseud had initiated

the protective order proceeding, and because Ms. Garcia had executed a written
acceptance of service of process waiving the formal requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 4,
Mr. Aboelseud had waived the requirement imposed by Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 that
he be properly served by Ms. Garcia with a copy of the protective order. The trial court
also ruled that Mr. Aboelseud was precluded from raising lack of proper service as a
defense to the charges brought against him by the State. (R. at 54-55).
13.

During the time frame in question, Ms. Garcia and the children lived with

Ms, Garcia's parents at the home of Ms. Garcia's parents. (R. at 69).
14.

Ms. Garcia testified that during the relevant time frame, Mr. Aboelseud

placed five (5) telephone calls to the home of Ms. Garcia's parents. (R. at 63-64). Ms.
Garcia further testified that the most Mr. Aboelseud ever said during any of the telephone
calls was "Hello", and on one occasion Mr. Aboelseud said "Stephanie." (R. at 65).
15.

Ms. Garcia claimed at trial that Mr. Aboelseud first called on October 17,

1995. With respect to this telephone call, Ms. Garcia claimed that she knew it was Mr.
Aboelseud even though she admitted the caller said absolutely nothing and hung up as
soon as she answered the telephone, and even though she did, not that time, have caller
ID. (R. at 63).
7

16.

Ms. Garcia testified that after this first alleged telephone call her parents

obtained caller ID service from U.S. West on October 18, 1995, and that they obtained a
caller ID box which would display the name of the individual originating the telephone
call. (R. at 63, 64).
17.

With respect to each of the four telephone calls that Ms. Garcia claimed

occurred after her parents had obtained caller ID, Ms. Garcia admitted that she read the
caller ID box display before answering the telephone, and that before she ever picked up
the receiver she already knew Mr. Aboelseud was the person placing the telephone call.
(R. at 70).
18.

Despite Ms. Garcia's testimony at trial that Mr. Aboelseud said

"Stephanie" on one occasion. Ms. Garcia admitted that when she filed her police report
she told the police that the only thing Mr. Aboelseud ever said was "Hello." (R. at 75).
19.

Ms. Garcia admitted that the telephone at her parents1 home is registered in

her parents' names. (R. at 76-77).
20.

Mr. Aboelseud admitted at trial that he in fact placed a few telephone

calls to the home of Ms. Garcia's parents during the relevant time frame. (R. at 87).
21.

Mr. Aboelseud further testified that the only purpose of those telephone

calls was to speak with Ms. Garcia's father, and that at no time did he ever call to speak
with Ms. Garcia. (R. at 87). Mr. Aboelseud further testified that the purpose of these
phone calls was to ask Ms. Garcia's parents to use their influence on their daughter to
persuade her to submit herself and one of the children to a blood test that had been
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ordered by the Honorable John A. Rokich, third district court judge, some ten months
earlier. This testimony was unrebutted and uncontested at trial.
22.

Mr. Aboelseud testified that at the time he tried to call Ms. Garcia's father

that he, Mr. Aboelseud. was aware that Ms. Garcia's father works at a restaurant that he
owns, that the restaurant is located only half a block away from the Garcia home, and that
Mr. Garcia does not maintain specific, regular hours at the restaurant. (R. at 88).
23.

The protective order at issue did not prohibit Mr. Aboelseud from

contacting Ms. Garcia's parents. (See State's Exhibit 2).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 and Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-5
make clear that a person can be held criminally liable for violating a protective order only
if the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had been properly
served, in accordance with the manner prescribed by Utah R. Civ. P. 4, with a certified
copy of the protective order at the time of the alleged violation. The State admitted it
could not prove this element of its prima facie case and, therefore, the trial court's ruling
must be reversed.
The protective order at issue did not prohibit Mr. Aboelseud from contacting Ms.
Garcia's parents. The trial court's finding that Mr. Aboelseud violated the protective
order by attempting to telephone Ms. Garcia's parents at their home is erroneous, and
such a broad interpretation of the protective order violates Mr. Aboelseud's due process
rights under the constitutions of the State of Utah and the United States.

9

The evidence does not support the verdict. There was no evidence of any intent to
violate to the protective order. Furthermore, Ms. Garcia admitted that at the time she
answered the telephone, she had actual knowledge that Mr. Aboelseud was the person
calling. Because Ms. Garcia answered the telephone with actual knowledge that Mr.
Aboelseud was calling, Ms. Garcia consented to contact by Mr. Aboelseud, and the fact
that Mr. Aboelseud then said "Hello" and on one occasion said "Stephanie" cannot
constitute a violation of the protective order.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT MR. ABOELSEUD
COULD NOT ASSERT LACK OF PROPER SERVICE AS A
DEFENSE AND THAT HE WAIVED THE STATUTORY
REQUIREMENT OF PERSONAL SERVICE BY COMMENCING
PROTECTIVE ORDER PROCEEDINGS IS ERRONEOUS,
A.

The Statutory Requirement Of Proper Service With A
Certified Copy Of The Protective Order Is An Element
Of The State's Prima Facie Case, And Is Not A Defense
That Can Be Waived.

The trial court ruled that Mr. Aboelseud was "precluded form raising the issue of
service or failure to obtain service as a defense'1 to the charges asserted against him. (R.
at 54). However, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 makes clear that the State must prove, as
an element of its prima facie case, that, at the time of the alleged violation, the defendant
had been "properly served" with the protective order. Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 765-108 provides that a person who has been restrained from having contact with another
person, pursuant to a protective order issued pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-1, et
seq., is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if that person violates the protective order "after
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having been properly served with it..." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (emphasis added).
The trial court's ruling that "the issue of service or failure to obtain service" was a
defense, and that Mr. Aboelseud could not raise the issue at trial, is erroneous.
B.

The State Admitted That Mr. Aboelseud Had Never
Been Served In The Manner Required By The Statute.

Prior to the commencement of trial, the State admitted that Mr. Aboelseud had not
been properly served with a certified copy of the protective order. See Statement of Facts
("Facts"), supra at \ 10. In light of this admission, the State could not prove all of the
elements necessary to establish its prima facie case under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108.
Therefore, the trial court's ruling that Mr. Aboelseud was guilty on the second count is
erroneous and must be reversed.
In order to avoid the undisputable fact that Mr. Aboelseud was never properly
served with the protective order, the State argued to the trial court that personal service in
compliance with Utah R. Civ. P. 4 was not required, and that constructive service, or
actual notice, was sufficient to comply with the statutory requirement that the protective
order be "properly served." Facts, supra at % 11. The trial court then interpreted Utah
Code Ann. § 30-6-5 in a manner which did not require personal service, and held that
because Ms. Garcia had signed a formal acceptance of service of process, that Mr.
Aboelseud had thereby waived service of process. The trial court's rulings on these issues
are erroneous.
As set forth above, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 makes clear that a person cannot
be held criminally liable for violating a protective unless the States proves that, at the
11

time of the alleged violation, the defendant had been "properly served" with the
protective order. For purposes of this action, the definition of "properly served" is found
in Utah Code Ann. § 30-6-5(a) which provides:
(5) Upon issuance of a protective order, either ex parte or
following a hearing, the court clerk shall provide four
certified copies to the party protected by that order. The
protected partv . . . shall: fa) cause a certified copy to be
served on the party restrained, in accordance with Rule 4 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: (Emphasis added).
Under the plain language of the statute, the only type of service which constitutes
proper service for purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 is where service is made in
accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 4. This conclusion is buttressed by the language of Utah
Code Ann. § 30-6-5(6) which provides:
If the defendant has been personally served with the ex
parte protective order and notice of the hearing regardless if
he appears at the hearing, and the court issues a protective
order, the terms of the ex parte protective order shall
remain in effect until a certified copy of the protective order
is properly served on the defendant. (Emphasis added).
This particular statutory provision reemphasizes and makes clear that the fact a restrained
party is present at the hearing where a protective order is granted does not alter the fact
that the protected is obligated to "properly serve," in the manner specified by Utah R.
Civ. P. 4, the restrained parry- with a certified copy of the protective order.
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Here, the State admitted at trial that no such personal service occurred. Therefore,
according to Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108, Mr. Aboelseud cannot be held to have
committed a criminal violation of the protective order. 3
Furthermore, the trial court's conclusion that Mr. Aboelseud waived the statutory
service requirement because it was he who commenced the protective order proceedings,
and because Ms. Garcia, as opposed to Mr. Aboelseud, signed a written acceptance of
service of process, cannot be supported by the facts or applicable law. Utah law is clear
that in order to create a valid waiver, there must have been "a voluntary and intentional
relinquishment of a known right." Becksteadv. Deseret Roofing Co., 831 P.2d 130, 132
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Anderson v. Brinkerhoff, 756 P.2d 95, 98 (Utah Ct. App.
1988)). Here, there is simply no evidence whatsoever that Mr. Aboelseud ever engaged
in any such intentional relinquishment of a known right. On the contrary, the only person
who made such a waiver was Ms. Garcia. It is an impermissible, and factually and
legally insupportable, leap to conclude that because Ms. Garcia waived her right to be
served in accordance with Utah R. Civ. P. 4, that Mr. Aboelseud also made such a waiver.
Mr. Aboelseud never executed any written waiver or acceptance of service of process
waiver, nor is there any evidence of any kind that he ever orally expressed any intention
to make such a waiver.

3

Whether Mr. Aboelseud committed a civil violation that would subject him to civil penalties is an
issue not before this Court.
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II.

THE PROTECTIVE ORDER DID NOT PROHIBIT MR.
ABOELSEUD FROM CONTACTING MS. GARCIA'S PARENTS.
THE COURT'S RULING THAT THE PROTECTIVE ORDER
PROHIBITED SUCH CONDUCT IS ERRONEOUS.
It is undisputed that the protective order did not prohibit Mr. Aboelseud from

communicating with Ms. Garcia's parents, that Mr. Aboelseud's only purpose in placing
the telephone calls to the Garcia residence was to speak with Ms. Garcia's father, and that
at no time did Mr. Aboelseud call with an intent or desire to speak with Ms. Garcia.
Notwithstanding these facts, the trial court ruled that Mr. Aboelseud should have known
that Ms. Garcia might answer the telephone and that, therefore, Mr. Aboelseud was guilty
of violating the protective order by attempting to communicate by telephone with Ms.
Garcia's father. Such a ruling is not supported by the language of the protective order,
which does not prohibit Mr. Aboelseud from communicating with Ms. Garcia's father.
The trial court's ruling on this issue is erroneous and violates Mr. Aboelseud's rights to
due process under the constitutions of the State of Utah and the United States because the
protective order did not prohibit him from communicating with Ms. Garcia's father. To
make such conduct a crime even though it was not prohibited by the plain language of the
protective order denies Mr. Aboelseud his rights to due process.
III.

THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING THAT MR. ABOELSEUD IS
CRIMINALLY LLABLE FOR NEGLIGENT VIOLATION OF THE
PROTECTIVE ORDER IS ERRONEOUS. UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-5-108 CONTEMPLATES THAT A VIOLATION MUST BE
INTENTIONAL IN ORDER TO CONSTITUTE A CRIMINAL ACT.
The trial court ruled that Mr. Aboelseud had "reason to know" that Ms. Garcia

might answer the telephone instead of one of her parents and that, therefore, placing the
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telephone calls was a criminal act, even though the calls were intended for Ms. Garcia's
father. Thus, in essence, the trial court ruled that a negligent violation of the protective
order constitutes a criminal act. However, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 contemplates that
only an intentional violation will constitute a criminal act. This conclusion is supported
by the recent clarifying amendment to this section of the code, which amendment clearly
provides for criminal liability only where a person "intentionally violates" a protective
order. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108(1) (as amended July 1, 1995). Because there is no
evidence in the record that Mr. Aboelseud intentionally violated the protective order, the
trial court's ruling must be reversed.
IV.

MS. GARCIA ADMITTED SHE ANSWERED THE TELEPHONE
WITH ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE THAT MR. ABOELSEUD WAS
THE PERSON CALLING. THEREFORE, MS. GARCIA
CONSENTED TO CONTACT BY MR. ABOELSEUD.
The record is clear that before Ms. Garcia answered the telephone calls in

question, she had actual knowledge that Mr. Aboelseud was the person calling.
Therefore, Ms. Garcia consented to the contact from Mr. Aboelseud. Because Ms. Garcia
consented to the contact, Mr. Aboelseud cannot be held to have violated the protective
order. The trial court's ruling that Mr. Aboelseud violated the protective order is not
supported by the evidence and must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment against Abdelaziz Aboelseud
should be reversed, and the charge against him should be dismissed with prejudice.
Respectfully submitted,
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DATED this 7th day of December, 1995.
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS
185 South State Street, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Ronald F. Price
Attorneys for Abdelaziz Aboelseud
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that the original and seven (7) copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLANT were mailed on this 7th day of December, 1995, postage fully prepaid, to
the Clerk of the Court, Utah Court of Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400 Salt Lake
City, Utah 84102.
I further certify that two (2) copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT
were mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the 7th day of December, 1995, to Katherine L.
Bernards-Goodman, Deputy District Attorney. 210 West 10000 South, Salt Lake City.
Utah 84070.
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ORIGINAL
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT
-0O0-

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 941019646
TRIAL

vs
ABDELAZIZ ABOELSEUD,

[Prepared without log
notes]

Defendant
-0O0-

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 28th day of April,
1995,

the above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the

Honorable T. Patrick Casey, sitting as Judge in the abovenamed Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the
following proceedings were had.
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1

with Mr. Aboelseud again, I have not talked to Ms. Frank, is

2

that they were both very surprised that they ended up with a

3

protective order.

4

So, whether that goes to whether it's stipulated--

5

THE COURT:

Okay.

That's an issue, as to, I

6

suppose, go to the merits, how--there's some argument on the

7

merits of the protective order, but I'm just--I want to make

8

sure I understand how this came about.

9
10

MS. BERNARDS-GOODMAN:
THE COURT:

Your Honor--

If Mr. Aboelseud was present in Court,

11

had counsel, Counsel had the defendant sign acceptance of

12

service, Counsel undoubtedly assisted Mr. Aboelseud in

13

getting--is it Aboelseud?

14
15

MR. PRICE:

Yes.

It's--the spelling of the last

name actually ends in e-u-d,
E-u-d.

not e-d.

16

THE COURT:

Okay.

17

Went and obtained the Judge's signature on the

18

protective order after it was signed off on by the domestic

19

relations commissioner that heard the matter, at least if

20

normal procedure was followed.

21

And that there--I can think of no circumstance under

22

which if the protective order was issued that way, Mr.

23

Aboelseud would have had anybody to serve on him.

24

got the protective order served on her by mail, but it was his

25

counsel that facilitated obtaining the protective order as I

I mean, she
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9
understand it.
I believe, for purposes of the statute, the

2
3

requirement of service was met when he and counsel obtained

4

the protective order as a mutual protective order in that case

5

because it was recommended by the Judge, and received a

6

personal copy of it at the time.

7

MR. PRICE:

If--if I could address that--

8

THE COURT:

Okay.

9

MR. PRICE:

--briefly, your Honor.

10

I think the — the wording of the statute, I think is

11

critical, and ler me hand your Honor a copy of the applicable

12

provision here with the--

13

THE COURT:

I understand.

14

MR. PRICE:

--highlighted in yellow on the copy.

15

And that--down there in Sub 5(A)--

16

THE COURT:

Uh huh.

.17

MR. PRICE:

--it talks specifically about whether a

18

protective order is issued either ex-parte or following a

19

hearing.

20

THE COURT:

Uh huh.

21

MR. PRICE:

And the statute contemplates a hearing

22

and I think the way it typically happens is, the parties are

23

present once they get to this point; where Ms. Garcia had been

24

served with an ex-parte protective order and the hearing then

25

was held on September 28th.
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1 I

And I think the language referring to a hearing in

2 I the statute would be superfluous if constructive notice was
3 | sufficient.

I don't think there's any other--I think that the

4 | fact that the statute contemplates a hearing and service
5

following the hearing, I think is critical.

6

THE COURT:

7

MS. BERNARDS-GOODMAN:

8
9
10

Well-And your Honor, if I could

respond.
THE COURT:

Just a moment, though.

The defendant in this case, the plaintiff in the

11

protective order proceeding, is the one who had to serve it

12

and the statute requires him to serve it 'cause he's the one

13

that took the initiative to get it, and the fact that it also

14

restrains him didn't—doesn 1 t impose upon the other party, the

15

responding party, to turn around and serve it back on him.

16

That seems to me to be nonsensical kind of--kind of

17

requirement.

18

MR. PRICE:

And if--and if I could address that

19

briefly, your Honor.

20

THE COURT:

Okay.

21

MR. PRICE:

The statute Sub 5 is not talking in

22

terms of, if the plaintiff obtains a protective order.

23

talking in terms of following issuance of a protective order,

24

any protective order, the--and then it says, the party--

25

THE COURT:

It's

Uh huh.
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1

claiming it hasn't been served upon them when they have the

2

notice.
And I don't think that's noticed in Section--or
mentioned in Section 76-5-108.

5

THE COURT:

Okay.

Anything else?

6

MR. PRICE:

Just to respond briefly to the

7

legislative intent argument.

I think the Utah law is clear

8

when interpreting the statute, you have to start with the

9

plain language of the statute, and you have to reconcile all

10

of the words that are used in the statute before you even g o -

11

before you take any further steps, and I think the plain

12

language of the statute is clear with respect to issuance of

13

any protective order and that any party that's protected has

14

to comply with the service procedures.

15

THE COURT:

It is my view, regardless of what might

16

have happened in--in other circumstances, that in proceeding

17

by obtaining a waiver of service or an acceptance of service

18

by mail from the defendant in that case, that the plaintiff in

19

that case, the defendant in this case, is precluded from

20

raising the issue of service or failure to obtain service as a

21

defense to this proceeding.

22

protective order, the defendant would have been restrained

23

from the conduct.

24
25

Clearly, under the terms of the

It's not a question of not knowing that the conduct
was prohibited.

It' s a matter of trying to use a claimed
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1

defect in service to avoid the consequences of violating the

2

order and I-•-I bel ieve that it is a fair reading of the

3

statute and of the intent o f the statute that in obtaining the

4

protective order, particularly at least in this case, where

5

the plaintiff obtained in that—plaintiff in that case, I'm--

6

have to keep the--where Mr. Aboelseud obtained a--an

7

acceptance of service and therefore, essentially a waiver of

8

the service requirements in this case, that he cannot turn

9

around and say, but I didn't waive it and--and I have a right

10

to require that she serve it on me.

11

Therefore, it would be my ruling in this that that

12

requirement would not preclude prosecution for this offense.

13

MR. PRICE: And if I could just make one last point

14

for the record, your Honor.

15

the requirement of proper service is not strictly a defense to

16

the charge, but is in fact an element of the prosecution to

17

prima facie case and I don't think--the fact that Title 78--or

18

Title 76, excuse me, specifically refers to proper service, I

19

don't think constructive service constitutes proper service

20

and therefore I don't think they can meet the elements of

21

their case.

22

I think it's our position that

THE COURT: All right.

And you can reserve that

23

argument, certainly, for purposes of any appeal, but that

24

doesn't change my ruling in this case.

25

Now, did you want to proceed with a trial in this
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contact whatsoever, other than to turn around and look and see
if she's there, contact — constitutes a violation of an order
not to make contact.
4 I

I think a fair reading of the order is if he came,

5 | he sure couldn't go up and talk to her, he couldn't probably
6 | make gestures at her or pass notes to her or glare at her in
7 | an attempt to do anything to intimidate her or anything like
8 | that; but showing up at a hearing, at this point, would be
9 | Constitutionally protected and even in October, is something
10 I that I think that Mr. Aboelseud had a right to do, so long as
11

he was on his best behavior, which he evidently was, and then

12

complied with the request to leave.

13

So, in many circumstances, I would certainly prefer

14

that both parties to a situation like this not be present in

15

the courtroom, but the fact of the matter is, it's an open

16

proceeding, he's an interested party and has a right to--to be

17

aware of what goes on in Court, so long as he doesn't

18

otherwise violate the protective order by directly making

19

contact.

20

21
22

So, I will not find the defendant guilty of the

first count.
With respect to the second count, there's no

23

evidence in connection with that charge of any sort of abusive

24

or threatening behavior; however, I think that the conduct of

25

the defendant clearly falls within the meaning of the no
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1 I contact provision.
2 I

He calls a place where he knows that the defendant

3

(sic) lives on at least one occasion, when the phone is

4

answered, he asks in a questioning voice, "Stephana?"

5

"Are you there?"

6

Clearly has reason to know that the--that Ms. Garcia is as

7

likely as anybody to pick up the phone, and perhaps the most

8

likely during this time of the day.

9

Or "Is that who's answering the phone?"

There may have been a reason for it, but there are

10

other ways of accomplishing that purpose.

11

those reasons justify making the contact.

12
13

I don't think that

Therefore, Mr. Aboelseud, I will find you guilty of
the second count of violating the protective order.

14
15

As if,

Did you wish me to consider the sentence on this
today?

16

MR. PRICE:

Yes, your Honor.

17

THE COURT:

I understand the circumstances and the

18

facts in connection with the case, so you don't need to

19

restate those for me.

20

client should stand at the lectern at this point--like to

21

address me regarding sentencing issues?

22

be aware of?

23

MR. PRICE:

Would you like to--you should, and your

Anything I ought to

Yes, beyond the facts of the case, your

24

Honor, we would simply indicate that the--the facts of the

25

case certainly, I don't think, justify any jail sentence being
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